Estimates of uninsured drivers in the United States hover around 15 percent (NAII, 1998). With extensive concern about insurance affordability and its effect on economic advancement (Joint Economic Committee, 1998) and with expansion of U.S. compensation systems to other nations, consideration of factors that affect the extent to which drivers choose to insure or not is valuable. This article addresses the effect of enforcement mechanisms for purchase of required insurance on the degree to which drivers choose not to insure. Results indicate that higher levels of enforcement stringency relate to lower levels of uninsured drivers. Lower levels of poverty and populations living in metropolitan areas are also related to lower levels of uninsured drivers, while no-fault states are associated with higher levels of uninsured motorists.
INTRODUCTION
Automobile insurance represents nearly 50 percent of property/liability insurance premium volume in the United States and similarly large percentages throughout the globe (Insurance Information Institute, 1997) . In part because of its market representation, automobile insurance has been the focus of numerous research projects. Much of this work has been oriented toward identification of factors that affect price and availability of the product, including consideration of the effect of regulation and market structure. No-fault laws and other tort reforms similarly have received extensive attention. Analyses of regulatory effects primarily focus on rating limitations and systems designed to provide coverage for high-risk drivers. Another factor appears relevant but receives scant attention: that of regulations requiring purchase of insurance and how these requirements affect the size of the uninsured motorist population.
In 1927, Massachusetts passed the first U.S. compulsory insurance law. Today, 43 states and the District of Columbia follow some version of compulsory law, 1 while the remaining seven states have financial responsibility laws.
2 Among states with compulsory insurance laws, various enforcement techniques exist. The authors test for relationships between various forms of insurance requirement enforcement laws and the relative incidence of uninsured motorists (UM) claims, using data from U.S. state experience. The results have implications for regulatory efforts designed to protect individuals involved in automobile accidents.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Automobile insurance markets have been given significant attention in the literature, including consideration of no-fault laws, regulatory constraints, and market structure. Additionally, a large body of theoretical work associated with insurance purchase decisions exists. Issues directly associated with UM, however, have received only limited attention beyond several trade reports and a number of articles on alternatives to individually purchased policies ("pay-at-the-pump" options).
The question of optimal insurance purchase decisions relates to UM through the option to forgo insurance despite rules to the contrary. Sinn (1982) considered the issue by recognizing the unbounded nature of liability exposures (in contrast with property exposures) relative to the bounded nature of assets. This disconnect between potential losses and available assets yields rational decisions to forgo insurance, an idea also modeled by Keeton and Kwerel (1984) . Huberman, Mayers, and Smith (1983) further demonstrate that bankruptcy potential offers a rationale for imposition of insurance limits, a form of selecting against the purchase of insurance.
Through simulation, Dahlby (1983) demonstrates that as the price of coverage increases, the percentage of drivers who purchase insurance decreases. Smith and Wright (1992) add to the discussion by providing evidence of a strong relationship between the price of automobile insurance and the relative size of the UM population, both in terms of price affecting the percentage of UM and in terms of the number of UM affecting price. Their work is mostly theoretical, with a smattering of data offered as support. Although no known published empirical investigation of the theory exists, 4 the 1 Among the states with compulsory insurance laws, 15 states mandate both first-party and liability insurance, one state mandates only first-party coverage, and the remaining 27 states and D.C. mandate only liability insurance. 2 With introduction of compulsory insurance, the term "financial responsibility laws" now is used just for those states where motorists must demonstrate financial resources to pay for potential liabilities following an accident even though insurance is not compulsory. 3 Such implications apply in the U.S. but perhaps more importantly are relevant abroad, where new rules are being implemented. This question is especially relevant in locations such as Taiwan, where many motorists drive without insurance and where new rules of liability are being developed. 4 Puelz (1998) has assembled an interesting data set for purposes of testing this theory explicitly and has generated preliminary results that support Smith and Wright. He does not consider the effect of insurance requirement enforcement techniques, which is the focus of this article.
industry has distributed several studies on the incidence of uninsured drivers. (see, e.g., Gastel, 1998; AIRAC, 1989; Sugarman, 1998) . These studies highlight patterns such as higher incidence of uninsured drivers in metropolitan areas and the importance of strict enforcement by the states.
Interestingly, Sinn concluded his 1982 piece with a recommendation for compulsory liability insurance, which later work shows to be suboptimal under various scenarios. According to Harrington (1994) , for example, ". . . it is not clear that compulsory BIL [bodily injury liability] coverage will be efficient given costly and imperfect enforcement, underwriting expense loadings in insurance premiums, higher dispute resolution costs, and expanded coverage for pain and suffering" (p. 122). Danzon and Harrington (1992) , in a survey of the literature, conclude that where imperfect information exists, compulsory insurance is likely to yield counter-productive results. An alternative to compulsory insurance is a fuel premium tax, which ensures universal coverage and also assesses costs in relation to driving activity (although not necessarily in relation to other risk factors) (Hoffer and Miller, 1995) . Bouzouita and Bajtelsmit (1997) and Tennyson (1997) do not consider insurance purchase decisions explicitly but do offer input to the discussion. Their work focuses on the effect of rate regulation on the automobile insurance market. Bouzouita and Bajtelsmit find a positive relationship between rate regulation and the relative size of the residual market, while Tennyson demonstrates that rate regulation itself has little if any effect on insurance market structures but that stringent rate regulation reduces incentives for insurers to participate in the auto insurance market. Their work is consistent with earlier research (see Harrington, 1992; Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans, 1989) demonstrating the mixed effects of rate regulation on insurance prices. The initial effect may well be lower prices, as apparently intended by regulators. If those prices fall below competitive levels, however, supply is likely to diminish and increasing percentages of drivers are likely to be placed in the residual market. An open question, then, is whether the involuntary market is indeed the market of last resort or whether drivers are choosing to violate state laws by driving without the required insurance.
Both economic and public policy reasons yield interest in identifying factors that affect the level of the UM population in a state, which averages an estimated 15 percent or more across the U.S. (NAII, 1998) . The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of insurance requirement enforcement laws on the relative size of the UM population. Other factors that may be related to the willingness of drivers to forgo their insurance obligations are also tested.
AUTOMOBILE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPULSORY INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
In the U.S., a variety of systems exist to require automobile liability insurance and to enforce those requirements. To protect individuals injured by a negligent driver, each state and the District of Columbia imposes responsibility on a vehicle owner and/or driver to purchase automobile liability insurance (or demonstrate availability of other sufficient assets in case of an accident). In some states, the requirement and enforcement can be considered relatively passive, where evidence of insurance or other assets is not required until an accident has occurred. The term typically used for this type of law is "financial responsibility." Other states require the purchase of insurance ("compulsory insurance laws") and require drivers to provide evidence of insurance at the time of an accident or shortly thereafter, to provide evidence at the time of vehicle registration, and/or to carry evidence of insurance in their vehicles at all times. Some compulsory insurance states further impose requirements on insurers to report insurance cancellations and/or nonrenewals. Each of these three levels of enforcement of insurance requirements is expected to affect the level of uninsured drivers in a state.
In addition to variations regarding insurance requirements and enforcement, states also differ in some other ways that are likely to affect relative levels of UM. These include the relative cost of insurance, whether the state follows a tort or no-fault compensation system, population wealth, and proportion of the populace that lives in metropolitan areas. Here, the relationship between states' enforcement techniques of automobile insurance requirements and relative levels of the UM population is tested while controlling for other state variations likely to affect the level of the UM population.
METHODOLOGY
The empirical model is tested on pooled cross-section and time-series data covering the 50 states and the District of Columbia for 1987 and 1992, the two dates for which data are available. Estimation of the empirical model is employed through a randomeffects (RE) model, which treats the state-specific effects as random variables. 5 Because of the endogeneity of the price of insurance, the error component two stage least squares (EC2SLS) is adopted (Baltagi, 1984) . 6 Based on the literature discussed above, the authors expect the relative size of the UM population to be affected by the price of insurance, wealth, and insurance compliance enforcement efforts. Additional factors, including regulatory constraints and the driving environment, may affect the size of the UM population by distorting these general relationships. The model developed for measuring the effect of financial responsibility enforcement laws on the level of UM, then, is the following:
, where µ i is state-specific unobserved effects and ε it denotes the general equation specific errors.
Automobile insurance price, measured as a state's average state liability premium per $1 coverage (UNITPREMIUM), is expected to be positively related to the size of the UM population. UM is measured as the ratio of the number of UM claims to the 5 Because the authors' main interest lies in the enforcement techniques that are virtually timeinvariant variables, the fixed-effects model is not appropriate for their purpose. A Hausman (1978) specification test is also employed, and the result does not reject the hypothesis that the random-effects model is in favor of the fixed-effects model. 6 In Baltagi's (1984) study, he demonstrates that EC2SLS is superior to two stage least squares (2SLS) or two stage variance components (2SVC) based on root mean squared error (RMSE). Furthermore, he shows that going from EC2SLS to error components three stage least squares (EC3SLS) may not be worth the effort for two equations model. number of bodily injury liability claims. This is a standard measure of the percentage of uninsured motorists among a population of motorists (NAII, 1998), 7 and although certain biases may exist, the authors do not know of reasons to expect such biases to dominate any specific jurisdictions. For example, uninsured drivers are expected to be involved in more accidents per 100 vehicles than are insured drivers; yet, there is no reason to presume that this bias will vary across states (Hunstadt, 1999) .
In addition to unit premium, relative wealth is expected to be a major factor in the decision of whether to drive without insurance. As noted by Sinn (1982) , Keeton and Kwerel (1984) , and others, individuals have no economic incentive to insure against liabilities in excess of their assets; hence, wealthier individuals are more likely to purchase insurance. 8 Furthermore, premiums represent a smaller fraction of one's income as income rises, making purchase more likely. The percent of the population below the poverty level (POVERTY), thus, is expected to be positively related to the relative level of the UM population.
Of primary interest in this research is the effect of a state's insurance enforcement efforts on its UM rate. As discussed above, three types of enforcement techniques exist. For coding purposes when one technique is subsumed in another, the state is designated as following the subsuming and thus stricter technique.
9 Of the three techniques, the strictest is to require that insurers inform a state agency when an automobile policy is canceled or not renewed. The authors expect states where such notice is required to have lower relative numbers of uninsured motorists than elsewhere. The next level of enforcement is found in states where drivers are required to purchase insurance under compulsory insurance laws (COMPULSORY). Generally these states also require drivers to carry evidence of insurance at the time of registration, at the time of inspection, and/or in their vehicles at all times. Compulsory insurance states are expected to have more uninsured motorists than where notice is required but to have fewer uninsured motorists than where no notice or compulsory insurance law exists. These latter are the financial responsibility states (FINAN-CIAL).
10 Table 1 lists the enforcement techniques in force during the two sample years, 1987 and 1992. The size of penalties also is expected to affect the level of the UM population. A consistent source of information for penalties during 1987 and 1992, however, does not exist and thus is not included in this analysis. 7 Over the years, several measures of the relative size of the UM population have been attempted. These measures include consumer surveys, vehicle registration samples, accident reports, other government agency information, and claims data. At present, use of claims data as done here is considered the superior method (AIRAC, 1984) . 8 The theory is further used to consider the existence of insurance limits. Thus, the actual amount of insurance is also affected by relative wealth. Here the authors are interested in the first level of choice, that of purchase or not, and hence they focus on the lower wealth status, the poverty level. 9 For example, some states require drivers to carry identification cards with them in their vehicles. Additionally, some of these states require that insurers notify a state agency if an insured cancels or does not renew coverage. Such a state will be designated as a "notice" state, the more restrictive enforcement technique. 10 Five states in 1987 and four states in 1992 have compulsory insurance laws but do not require evidence of insurance at the time of registration, at the time of inspection, and/or in drivers' vehicles at all times. The analysis was also conducted with these states categorized in the third, least restrictive, category, and the results are essentially the same. The best analysis of enforcement technique effects would use data pre-and postimplementation. Lacking such data, one cannot distinguish between effects of the legislation and associations between forms of legislation and levels of the UM population. For example, states with high levels of uninsured motorists will be home to lenient enforcement techniques, given the interests of the UM population.
In addition to unit premium, wealth, and enforcement techniques, various other state factors also are expected to help explain differences in relative numbers of UM claims. Prior studies (AIRAC, 1989) have identified metropolitan areas as high-incidence locales of UM drivers (MET). Possible explanations, beyond price, include the lack of law enforcement interest in pursuing uninsured drivers when other more serious crimes are prevalent, and/or a general greater willingness among the public to violate legal restrictions in high-density areas. Metropolitan areas are also expected to have higher levels of accidents. One would expect this variation to be included in premium; however, use of state averages could mask some of these relationships and must be recognized when interpreting results of this study.
A state's liability system, listed in Table 2 , may also affect the incidence of uninsured drivers. In a no-fault (NF) state, drivers are not financially responsible for low-valued harms to others, which could alter insurance purchase decisions. One potential effect is that because of the omission of numerous lawsuits from the system, less incentive exists to purchase liability insurance and/or greater incentive exists to purchase all forms of first-party coverage including UM insurance. Additionally, higher levels of UM claims might be observed if claims adjusters in no-fault states consider the difference between paying UM and no-fault benefits sufficiently marginal so as to limit their denial of UM claims in some instances. It is possible, however, that the attitudinal shift due to no-fault, if one exists, would be toward greater levels of obligation and thus purchase of insurance. Thus, the effect of no-fault on the UM population is unclear a priori. Because add-on states do not alter one's rights to sue but rather simply make available first-party coverages, these states are coded as tort states in the analysis. Results when using three categories confirm that tort and add-on have the same relationship with the UM population.
An important factor associated with no-fault is that some states do not apply tort thresholds to UM claims, which will yield higher relative levels of UM claims (AIRAC, 1984) . Two states, Colorado and Michigan, permit UM claims regardless of the tort threshold and are thus designated with an instrumental variable in this analysis (NOTHRESH).
Price of insurance, for which the average state liability premium per $1 of coverage is used as a proxy here, not only affects the level of uninsured drivers, but also is affected by the level of uninsured drivers, calling for a simultaneous equations' approach to the analysis. The equation is one designed to represent premiums and has been modeled using recent theoretical and empirical studies regarding insurance pricing (Grabowski et al., 1989; Harrington, 1992) : Variables included in this equation represent the various input costs for providing insurance along with a measure of regulatory constraints. Exogenous variables excluded from the UM equation are INCOME, MEDEXP, REG, RESMKT, and THEFT. A positive relationship is expected between each of the input cost variables and unit premium. A negative relationship is expected with rate regulation, based on the assumption that regulators in recent years have been more concerned with excessive rather than adequate rates, as reported by Grabowski, et al. (1989) and others. Theft is the one variable in need of explanation. Originally the analysis was conducted using a combined premium variable (liability plus physical damage), and in that analysis, incorporation of theft was done for purposes of measuring potential property damage losses. When using the more refined liability premium per unit of coverage as the dependent variable, exclusion of theft from the model substantially reduced its goodness of fit. Hence, the authors have included theft in the model because they believe that it may be a reflection of attitudes toward law and order and, as a result, a reflection of likely claims build-up for bodily injury coverage.
Data for these two equations are obtained from the sources listed in the Appendix. Summary statistics of variables are reported in Table 3 .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As stated above, because of the endogeneity of premium and the nature of panel data, EC2SLS is more appropriate than other models. Table 4 reports the results from both RE models (without dealing with the simultaneity problem) and EC2SLS model. Although the results are similar from both approaches, focus is given to the EC2SLS because it accounts for the endogeneity of unit premium.
As hypothesized, coefficients of the two enforcement techniques with less strength in them (COMPULSORY and FINANCIAL) yield a statistically significantly higher level of uninsured drivers than does the stricter requirement that insurers notify state agencies when insureds cancel coverage. Furthermore, the coefficient for the financial responsibility (the weakest) approach is statistically significantly larger than for the compulsory insurance approach.
Several other state factors are statistically associated with the UM population as well.
As hypothesized and consistent with extant literature, with increasing percentages of the population falling below the poverty level, more drivers are uninsured. The issue of affordability recently has received attention at the national political level and has also been the subject of policy recommendations in prior literature (Joint Economic Committee, 1998; Smith and Wright, 1992; Keeton and Kwerel, 1984) . These results support continued consideration of the affordability issue. The percent of people living in metropolitan areas is also positively related to relative levels of UM claims. This result is tempered somewhat, however, by the high correlation (.61) of metropolitan population density with insurance unit price, particularly because the premium coefficient does not show a significant relationship with relative levels of UM claims when both UNITPREMIUM and MET are included in the model, but UNITPREMIUM is statistically significant at .001 without MET. A possible explanation for these results is that state average data are insufficiently refined to capture variations in premiums across populations, particularly the highpriced urban areas where greater levels of poverty also exist. The metropolitan variable might account for these premium variations, thus leaving little else for the premium variable to contribute in the model.
11
11 Thanks to Greg Niehaus for this insight.
Interestingly, no-fault laws are associated with relatively higher levels of UM claims, even when controlling for the two states that allow UM claims below the tort threshold (although only at the 10 percent level). The threshold control is also marginally significant, and positive as expected. When the states are categorized as verbal versus monetary threshold, the coefficient for monetary threshold demonstrates the positive relationship with the UM population while the coefficient for verbal is not statistically significant. And when compensation systems are categorized as tort, no-fault, and add-on, with tort as the omitted category, the no-fault coefficient remains statistically significantly positive, while add-on shows no statistical significance with the UM population. 
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Based on the results of this research, efforts aimed at reducing the relative size of the UM population ought to consider the use of strict enforcement techniques. A question not considered in this research, and that is critical in evaluating the desirability of differing techniques, is the relative cost effectiveness of various techniques. Notice requirements are expected to result in higher costs than either passive or evidence techniques. Whether the reduction in the UM population is worth the additional cost is not known at this time.
Several other tests also would be desirable. For example, the level of penalties for failure to maintain proper insurance likely contributes to an individual's willingness to drive uninsured. Information on these penalties are not available for the time period of this study, which is why it is not included. Additionally, a study that accounts for the before and after effects of penalties for failure to comply with insurance requirements is desirable. The study here cannot control for the possibility that strict (or lenient) penalties are associated with states that have certain UM attributes. That is, the cause and effect of the penalties cannot be discerned. Analysis using individual consumer data would further add to the richness of the understanding of insurance purchase decisions and the effect of state laws on those decisions.
Additional issues highlighted by the results of this study include the effect of poverty, metropolitan areas, and no-fault on the level of uninsured motorists. Furthermore, any policy maker searching for improvement in financial responsibility of automobile drivers ought to consider proposals for premium fuel taxes as a mechanism to achieve universal insurance coverage. Potential issues associated with moral hazard arise from a premium fuel tax, yet these issues may well prove less troublesome than the costs and inequities of compulsory insurance laws. (See Sommer et al., 1995 and Wenzel, 1995 for extensive discussions of this topic.)
APPENDIX
Data Sources for Regression Analysis
State Insurance Enforcement Laws in 1987
All-Industry Research Advisory Council, October 1989, Uninsured Motorists (Oak Brook, IL: AIRAC).
